



Use It or Lose It: State Approaches to Increasing 
Use-Tax Revenue 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Internet has only existed in its current, recognizable form for 
around twenty years.  During this brief period, the Internet has 
completely changed the way society operates.  From buying goods and 
services to finding a companion, the Internet has forever altered human 
interaction.  One of its most significant advances is undoubtedly the rise 
of electronic commerce, or e-commerce.  E-commerce allows purchasers 
and sellers to conduct transactions across thousands of miles, often with 
each party unaware of the other’s identity.  This lack of physical contact, 
a hallmark of e-commerce, is markedly different than most brick-and-
mortar businesses. 
In 1999, e-commerce sales totaled almost $1 trillion.1  Just seven 
years later, that number ballooned to almost $2.5 trillion.2  E-commerce 
sales show no sign of slowing down; some analysts estimate sales will 
increase to $4 trillion in 2012.3  While the expansion of the Internet and 
e-commerce has been a blessing for some businesses, this trend has 
caused many states and localities to become concerned over lost sales-tax 
revenues.4  With most e-commerce sales coming from remote sellers—or 
entities, businesses, or individuals that lack a material physical presence 
within a taxing jurisdiction5—the majority of these sales avoid state and 
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 1. Donald Bruce, William F. Fox & LeAnn Luna, State and Local Sales Tax Revenue Losses 
from E-Commerce, 52 ST. TAX NOTES 537, 538 (2009). 
 2. Id. 
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 5. This definition parallels the one used by the Streamlined Sales Tax Project.  Frequently 
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local sales taxes.6  Furthermore, e-commerce replaces transactions made 
through local, brick-and-mortar stores that are subject to sales tax.  The 
current poor economic climate only increases states’ worries about their 
ability to maintain or increase tax revenues. 
Sales taxes are consumption-type taxes, which are “commonly 
understood to be a tax on the sale of tangible personal property.”7  
Businesses collect sales taxes at the point of sale and remit the collected 
funds to the appropriate taxing authority.8  The payment of sales tax is 
always the responsibility of the purchaser.9  In the United States, for 
fiscal year 2008, states and localities relied on sales taxes for almost 23% 
of total revenue.10  Because sales taxes play a large role in state and local 
budgets, the possibility of collecting tax from online and interstate 
transactions remains a hotly debated issue.  The complexity and 
nonuniformity of the current sales tax system, however, makes it difficult 
for states to collect taxes from remote sellers.11  Currently, 8,000 
different taxing jurisdictions exist in the United States—each with their 
own bases, rates, and exemptions.12  Additionally, the jurisdictions are 
not easily identifiable, as they do not even coincide with normally 
recognizable boundaries—such as five- or nine-digit zip codes.13 
States have long had the power to tax transactions that transcend 
state boundaries.  States exercise this power through use taxes, which 
                                                                                                                       
Asked Questions, STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOV’G BD., INC., http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/ 
index.php?page=faqs (last visited Nov. 3, 2011). 
 6. Bruce, Fox & Luna, supra note 1, at 542 (estimating “that taxes are uncollected on a little 
more than 4 percent of e-commerce”).  
 7. 68 AM. JUR. 2D Sales and Use Tax § 1 (2010) (citing Mr. B’s, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 706 
N.E.2d 1001, 1005 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)). 
 8. See id.  A sales tax “is separately stated and collected on a transaction-by-transaction basis 
from the consumer; although the economic burden of the sales tax falls upon the consumer, the seller 
has the statutory duty to collect the tax for the taxing jurisdiction.”  Id. (citing CHARLES A. TROST & 
PAUL JAMES HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION § 11.1 (2d ed. 
2003)). 
 9. See id. (citing TROST & HARTMAN, supra note 9, § 11.1). 
 10. Kail Padgitt & Ryan Forster, Where Do State and Local Governments Get Their Tax 
Revenue?, TAX FOUND. (Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.taxfoundation.org/research/show/26662.html.  
This does not include the amount collected from excise or selective taxes—such as those taxes 
collected on tobacco and alcohol—which accounted for an estimated 11% of revenue for states and 
localities in 2008.  Id. 
 11. Joseph Henchman, Nearly 8,000 Sales Taxes and 2 Fur Taxes: Reasons Why the 
Streamlined Sales Tax Project Shouldn’t Be Quick to Declare Victory, TAX FOUND. (July 28, 2008), 
http://www.taxfoundation.org/blog/show/23423.html. 
 12. Joseph Henchman, Testimony Before Maryland Legislature on the Streamlined Sales Tax 
Project, TAX FOUND. (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.taxfoundation.org/publications/ show/24346.html. 
 13. Henchman, supra note 11. 
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complement sales taxes and are “imposed on the use of certain goods that 
are bought outside the taxing authority’s jurisdiction.”14  Use taxes 
prevent residents from avoiding sales taxes by purchasing goods from 
states that do not have a sales tax.15  Currently, all forty-five states that 
levy a sales tax also levy a complementary use tax.16  Use taxes are a 
constitutional method of assessing tax liability on purchases from out-of-
state retailers;17 however, problems arise when states try to raise the 
historically low use-tax compliance rates to increase revenue. 
The fact that such a large percentage of state and local revenues 
come from sales taxes—coupled with the boom of e-commerce over the 
last decade—has led states to pursue many avenues when trying to 
collect sales and use taxes related to those transactions.18  A study 
estimated that in 1999 alone—well before the e-commerce boom—states 
collected a total of $140 million in sales and use taxes from business-to-
consumer e-commerce transactions, but another $525 million in potential 
sales and use taxes remained uncollected.19  The amount of uncollected 
sales and use tax for states and local governments related to e-commerce 
sales is “expected to grow from $8.6 billion in 2010 . . . to $11.4 billion 
in 2012.”20  Taxes collected from e-commerce sales remain low because 
of individuals’ noncompliance with the use tax,21 businesses’ 
unwillingness to cooperate with use-tax collection,22 a lack of a definite  
  
                                                          
 14. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1597 (9th ed. 2009); see also discussion infra Part II.A. 
 15. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1597 (9th ed. 2009). 
 16. ADVISORY COMM’N ON ELEC. COMMERCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS 13 (2000), available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ecommerce/acec_report.pdf [hereinafter ACEC REPORT]. 
 17. See Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 582–83 (1937).  “Things acquired or 
transported in interstate commerce may be subjected to a [nondiscriminatory] tax” on use or 
enjoyment.  Id. at 582 (citing Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 169, 175 (1935); Cudahy 
Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U.S. 450, 453 (1918); Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 
563, 575 (1910); Am. Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U.S. 500, 519 (1903); Woodruff v. Parham, 
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123, 137 (1868)). 
 18. See discussion infra Part II.D. 
 19. See Untaxed Web Sales Cost States $525 Million in 1999, NATION’S CITIES WKLY., Mar. 
13, 2000, at 2 (discussing JAMES MCQUIVEY & GILLIAN DEMARTIN, FORRESTER RESEARCH, INC., 
STATES LOSE HALF A BILLION IN TAXES TO WEB RETAIL (2000)). 
 20. Bruce, Fox & Luna, supra note 1, at 540.  The authors forecast a total of $52.1 billion in 
lost state sales and use tax revenue over the six-year period from 2007 to 2012.  Id. 
 21. See id. at 557–58. 
 22. See, e.g., Amazon.com LLC v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 877 N.Y.S.2d 842, 846 
(Sup. Ct. 2009) (noting the company’s argument that absent substantial nexus with New York, out-
of-state entities should be exempt from the state’s use-tax collection), aff’d as modified, 913 
N.Y.S.2d 129 (App. Div. 2010); see also discussion infra Part II.C.1. 
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standard from either the Supreme Court23 or Congress, and the non-
uniform sales- and use-tax systems that span the United States.24 
Recently, states have attempted to solve the use-tax problem.  In the 
absence of Congress’s adopting a nationwide standard, states have 
struggled to find a constitutionally acceptable approach to increasing 
use-tax compliance and revenue.  Three distinct solutions have 
developed: affiliate taxes,25 increased notification standards,26 and the 
Streamlined Sales Tax Project.27  Each approach offers a unique attempt 
to increase use-tax revenue while remaining within the boundaries of the 
law. 
This Comment will explain each approach, evaluate each approach’s 
constitutionality, and determine whether the approach will actually raise 
revenue.  Part II of this Comment describes both the current status of use 
taxes and the states’ approaches to increasing revenue therefrom.  Part III 
begins by analyzing the constitutionality of each approach and continues 
with an assessment of the feasibility of state implementation.  Finally, 
Part III concludes with a discussion of whether the respective approaches 
will actually achieve their goals: raising use-tax compliance and revenue. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Use Taxes 
Use taxes are the main method employed by states to tax transactions 
that take place across state lines.  Use taxes are constitutional so long as 
they are nondiscriminatory and compensating; they must equalize taxes 
on both locally produced and imported goods.28  A relatively simple 
example demonstrates how use taxes operate.  Suppose a resident of 
State A—a state that imposes sales and use taxes at a rate of 10%—goes 
to State B—a state that has no sales tax—to buy a new widget.  
Unbeknown to most individuals, if this resident intends to bring the 
                                                          
 23. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 316–17 (1992) (noting the legal “quagmire” 
in this area (quoting Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457–58 (1959)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 24. See Henchman, supra note 11. 
 25. See infra Part II.D.1. 
 26. See infra Part II.D.2. 
 27. See infra Part II.D.3. 
 28. See Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 582–84 (1937) (upholding a Washington 
use tax that provided an offset if the object had been subject to an equivalent use or sales tax in the 
state of purchase). 
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widget back into State A and use it there, then he must pay State A’s use 
tax.  The amount due is the sales tax that the resident would owe if he 
purchased the widget in State A—10% of the purchase price—less the 
tax he paid in State B.  Since State B imposes no sales tax, the resident 
will owe State A a use-tax equivalent to 10% of the purchase price.  
Thus, if the resident bought the widget for $1,000, then he would owe 
$100 in use tax to State A.  Further, even if State B had a sales tax, the 
resident of State A would have a use-tax liability in State A so long as the 
sales tax charged in State B was less than 10%.  In a situation in which 
State B’s sales tax rate was 4%, the resident of State A would have use-
tax liability in State A for the remaining 6% of the purchase price. 
As the hypothetical shows, use taxes are often hard to calculate and 
even harder to enforce.  “States have historically viewed the use tax on 
individuals as impractical to enforce—the tax typically involves a small 
amount owed on a large number of transactions for which the individual 
has not kept records, and the costs of collection could easily exceed the 
revenues collected.”29  This has led to low use-tax compliance in 
business-to-consumer sales.30  Another reason the collection rates are 
low “is that taxing agencies have no practical means of identifying 
individual purchases or their consumers, making enforcement 
difficult.”31  Use-tax collection is high, however, in business-to-business 
transactions because the businesses are subject to audits and often have a 
better understanding of the law.32  Individuals do have higher use-tax 
compliance when purchasing automobiles from out-of-state sellers.33  
The increased collection rate likely occurs because the individual’s state 
of residence will not register the car until the purchaser pays the use tax.  
The historically low use-tax compliance rates of individuals is an issue 
that all three approaches discussed in Part II.D seek to address; it remains 
to be seen if any approach can remedy the problem. 
B. Setting the Stage: Quill Corp. v. North Dakota 
In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, the United States Supreme Court 
developed and applied the current approach to use-tax collection from 
                                                          
 29. NINA MANZI, USE TAX COLLECTION ON INCOME TAX RETURNS IN OTHER STATES, at 4 
(Minn. 2010), available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/usetax.pdf. 
 30. ACEC REPORT, supra note 16, at 13. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 13–14. 
 33. Bruce, Fox & Luna, supra note 1, at 553. 
GRIFFITHS FINAL 4/19/2012  2:26 PM 
654 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
remote sellers.34  The case centered on a North Dakota law that required 
every retailer that maintained a place of business in the state to collect 
and remit a use tax.35  The statute defined a retailer as anyone “who 
engage[d] in regular or systematic solicitation” within the state.36  “State 
regulations in turn define[d] ‘regular or systematic solicitation’ to mean 
three or more advertisements within a [twelve]-month period.”37  The 
law, in effect, required all businesses that advertised in North Dakota to 
collect and remit the use tax.38  Quill was a Delaware corporation with no 
employees, offices, or tangible property within North Dakota.39  Quill’s 
solicitation of business in North Dakota through “catalogs and flyers, 
advertisements in national periodicals, and telephone calls”40 subjected it 
to the law’s requirements.41  The Supreme Court held that requiring Quill 
to collect the use tax violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.42  The 
Court rejected previous decisions by stating that the Due Process Clause 
did not bar the enforcement of North Dakota’s law.43  The Court wrote 
that “Quill has purposefully directed its activities at North Dakota 
residents[ and] that the magnitude of those contacts is more than 
sufficient for due process purposes.”44  Thus, because the law related to 
benefits that Quill received from North Dakota, it satisfied the due 
process analysis.45 
The case turned on the Dormant Commerce Clause, with the Court 
reaffirming a four-part test to determine the constitutionality of a tax: 
                                                          
 34. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 317–18 (1992) (upholding bright-line test). 
 35. Id. at 302. 
 36. Id. at 302–03 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-01(6) (Supp. 1991)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 37. Id. at 303 (citing N.D. ADMIN. CODE 81-04.1-01-03.1 (1988)). 
 38. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-07). 
 39. Id. at 302. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 303. 
 42. Id. at 309–19. 
 43. Id. at 305–08.  While the Court conceded that the Commerce Clause and Due Process 
Clause were similar, it noted that “the Clauses pose distinct limits on the taxing powers of the 
States.”  Id. at 305. The Court decided to 
[A]bandon[] more formalistic tests that focused on a defendant’s “presence” within a 
State in favor of a more flexible inquiry into whether a defendant’s contacts with the 
forum made it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of Government, to require 
it to defend the suit in that State. 
Id. at 307. 
 44. Id. at 308. 
 45. Id. 
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[The Supreme Court] will sustain a tax against a Commerce Clause 
challenge so long as the “tax [1] is applied to an activity with a 
substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] 
does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly 
related to services provided by the State.”46 
As was the case in Quill, the “substantial nexus” requirement causes 
most modern disputes regarding use-tax collection.  While the Court 
explicitly noted that the Dormant Commerce Clause requires a 
“substantial nexus” between a taxing jurisdiction and remote seller, it did 
nothing more than give an example of what did not constitute a 
substantial nexus: contacts by a common carrier.47  Thus, as was the case 
with Quill, when a business’s only contact with a state comes through 
mail advertisements and remote sales, the state cannot require use-tax 
collection from that business.48  The Court held that the law 
discriminated against, or unduly burdened, interstate commerce.49  This 
burden arose because different taxing jurisdictions’ “many variations in 
rates of tax, in allowable exemptions, and in administrative and record-
keeping requirements could entangle [a remote seller] in a virtual welter 
of complicated obligations.”50  Even though the Court declared the North 
Dakota law unconstitutional, it recognized that the legal system must 
address the use-tax problem. 
The Court in Quill reiterated that Congress had the ability to overrule 
its decision.51  By doing away with the due process argument, the Court 
opened the door for Congress to legislate,52 stating that “Congress is now 
free to decide whether, when, and to what extent the States may burden 
interstate mail-order concerns with a duty to collect use taxes.”53  This 
suggestion was not novel, as the Court had previously stated that “[i]t is 
clear that the legislative power granted to Congress by the Commerce 
                                                          
 46. Id. at 311 (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)). 
 47. Id. at 311–12. 
 48. Id. at 312. 
 49. See id. at 318–19. 
 50. Id. at 313 n.6 (quoting Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 759–60 
(1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 51. Id. at 318. 
 52. John A. Swain, State Sales and Use Tax Jurisdiction: An Economic Nexus Standard for the 
Twenty-First Century, 38 GA. L. REV. 343, 364 (2003). 
 53. Quill, 504 U.S. at 318.  The Court further explained that “the underlying issue is not only 
one that Congress may be better qualified to resolve, but also one that Congress has the ultimate 
power to resolve.  No matter how we evaluate the burdens that use taxes impose on interstate 
commerce, Congress remains free to disagree with our conclusions.”  Id. (footnote omitted) (citing 
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946)). 
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Clause of the Constitution would amply justify the enactment of 
legislation requiring all States to adhere to uniform rules for the division 
of income.” 54  In the eighteen years since the Quill decision, however, 
Congress has not taken action,55 thus leaving it up to the states to find a 
solution.  Several states have taken steps to increase use-tax revenues, as 
evidenced by the different approaches analyzed by this Comment. 
While the Quill decision created the ambiguous standard requiring a 
“substantial nexus,” the states brought this standard upon themselves.56  
The inordinate amount of taxing jurisdictions likely led the Court to feel 
“compelled to protect the constitutional guarantee of an open market for 
domestic goods from the threat of diminished interstate trade that would 
result from rules so cumbersome in their multiplicity.”57  “[T]he Court 
seems to have left businesses dealing in interstate commerce more 
vulnerable to tax attacks . . . . [On the other hand, it] may have left the 
door open for businesses to argue that ‘substantial nexus’ requires 
physical presence.”58  Without a definite standard, states are unsure of 
their ability to tax remote sellers and, in response, have developed many 
innovative approaches.59  The Court in Quill noted that, “with certain 
restrictions, interstate commerce may be required to pay its fair share of 
state taxes,”60 which at least keeps open the possibility that remote sellers 
may face use-tax liability. 
                                                          
 54. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280 (1978). 
 55. While legislators have introduced such simplifying legislation, Congress has not enacted 
any of the proposals.  See Sales Tax Fairness and Simplification Act, H.R. 3396, 110th Cong. 
(2007); Streamlined Sales Tax Simplification Act, S. 2153, 109th Cong. (2005); Streamlined Sales 
and Use Tax Act, S. 1736, 108th Cong. (2003); Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Act, H.R. 3184, 
108th Cong. (2003); Internet Tax Moratorium and Equity Act, S. 512, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 56. Brian Galle, Designing Interstate Institutions: The Example of the Streamlined Sales and 
Use Tax Agreement (“SSUTA”), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1381, 1387 (2007) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court limited states’ authority to collect sales and use taxes from non-local sellers in large 
part because of “states’ irresponsibility in allowing a bewildering array of state and local sales tax 
rules to develop”). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Christina T. Le, Comment, The Honeymoon’s Over: States Crack Down on the Virtual 
World’s Tax-Free Love Affair with E-Commerce, 7 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 395, 407–08 (2007) 
(citing Quill, 504 U.S. at 314).  As one commentator observed, “[i]nstead of providing a concrete 
test for states and businesses to determine when ‘substantial nexus’ exists, the ruling has only 
opened myriad uncertainties and confusion about taxation of interstate commerce.”  Id. at 407. 
 59. See infra Part II.D. 
 60. Quill, 504 U.S. at 310 n.5 (quoting D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 31 (1988)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  As the Court has explained “[i]t was not the purpose of the 
[C]ommerce [C]lause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state 
tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing business.”  Commonwealth Edison Co. v. 
Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 623–24 (1981) (first alteration in original) (quoting Colonial Pipeline Co. v. 
Traigle, 421 U.S. 100, 108 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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C. Problems Arising from the Application of Quill 
1. Entity Isolation 
The Supreme Court in Quill attempted to set out a bright-line rule to 
calm the uneasy waters of use-tax liability.61  Despite the good intentions 
of the Court, its adoption of the “substantial nexus” standard has led to 
undesirable results.  Many businesses now engage in the practice of 
entity isolation to avoid creating a “substantial nexus” with the taxing 
jurisdiction.  Entity isolation “involves a relatively simple restructuring: 
isolate the firm’s remote sales operations in a legal entity that is separate 
from the legal entity that holds the firm’s store operations.”62  When 
done correctly, the distinct legal entity erodes the original business’s 
substantial nexus with the state, and the business avoids the 
responsibility of collecting sales and use taxes.63  The business must take 
care to ensure that the remote-selling division of the business is 
distinct—in both reality and substance—from the physically present 
entity in order to avoid use-tax liability.64 
Several large companies have attempted to gain the benefits of entity 
isolation, and some have succeeded—most notably the online retailer 
Amazon.com.65  Amazon has leased facilities in at least nineteen 
states66—which presumably provides those states with the requisite 
substantial nexus—“but it pays sales taxes in only five of them.”67  
Further, while Amazon asserts that collecting use taxes would be unduly 
burdensome, Amazon “already calculates and collects sales tax in at 
least 44 of the 45 states that levy them for independent companies that 
                                                          
 61. Quill, 504 U.S. at 315–16. 
 62. Mark J. Cowan, Tax Planning Versus Business Strategy: The Rise and Fall of Entity 
Isolation in Sales and Use Taxes, 44 IDAHO L. REV. 63, 65 (2007). 
 63. Le, supra note 58, at 409. 
 64. See Walter Baudier, Note, Internet Sales Taxes from Borders to Amazon: How Long Before 
All of Your Purchases Are Taxed?, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. no. 5, ¶¶ 9–10 (2006) (discussing 
Borders Group’s failure to sufficiently separate its online and brick-and-mortar divisions). 
 65. See Michael R. Gordon, Comment, Up the Amazon Without a Paddle: Examining Sales 
Taxes, Entity Isolation, and the “Affiliate Tax”, 11 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 299, 306–07 (2010).  This 
Comment will often refer to Amazon and its business practices.  Given Amazon’s status as the 
largest online retailer, its many attempts at avoiding liability for use-tax collection, and the ingenious 
ways it has tried to achieve this, Amazon provides a particularly apt example. 
 66. Id. at 307. 
 67. Id. (citing Randall Stross, Sorry, Shoppers, but Why Can’t Amazon Collect More Tax?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 27, 2009, at BU3). 
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sell their merchandise on Amazon’s website.”68  Amazon would likely 
face minimal administrative burdens if it had to collect use tax for its 
own sales.  In contrast, small online retailers that only sell their own 
products and do not have a method in place to calculate and collect use 
taxes face a larger burden.  Any state that wishes to tax remote sellers 
must be cognizant of the problems caused by entity isolation.  Every 
approach discussed in this Comment addresses entity isolation in its own 
way. 
2. Unfair Burdens Placed on Physically Present Businesses 
While many online retailers may claim that new use-tax laws 
discriminate against interstate commerce, the new laws actually appear to 
level the playing field between remote sellers and retailers who must 
collect sales and use taxes.  This occurs because of the lack of awareness 
of the use tax by individual consumers.  Therefore, whether a purchase 
occurs in a physical store or through an online retailer, the same sales tax 
applies—or the complementary use tax, in the case of a remote sale.  
While many consumers purchase products online for better deals, remote 
sellers only use a façade of lower prices; “[b]ecause the purchaser has to 
pay an identical use tax to the state, the price is not actually any lower 
except to the lawbreaker who does not pay the tax.”69  The reality of the 
lower prices that online retailers advertise is that the burden of collecting 
the tax is passed from the business—which often will have the necessary 
procedures in place to determine tax liability—to the individual—who is 
often unaware the use-tax liability even exists. 
Another factor that shows the unfairness of the current system is that 
many large retailers that maintain both online retail websites and 
physical businesses within a state must collect use taxes on all remote 
sales, even though the purchases may have little connection to the in-
state physical store.70  “Walmart, Barnes & Noble, and Best Buy, for 
example, manage to collect sales tax on their Internet sales in every state 
in which they have a retail store.”71  It is likely that these companies 
could advance many of the same frivolous arguments—the compliance 
                                                          
 68. MICHAEL MAZEROV, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, AMAZON’S ARGUMENTS 
AGAINST COLLECTING SALES TAXES DO NOT WITHSTAND SCRUTINY 4 (Nov. 29, 2009), available 
at http://www.cbpp.org/files/11-16-09sfp.pdf. 
 69. Gordon, supra note 65, at 315 (footnote omitted). 
 70. MAZEROV, supra note 68, at 5. 
 71. Id. 
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and administrative costs are unduly burdensome—that several remote 
sellers do.  As the Supreme Court has held, “[i]t was not the purpose of 
the [C]ommerce [C]lause to relieve those engaged in interstate 
commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it 
increases the cost of doing business.”72  This undermines the argument 
that administrative burdens caused by use-tax collection on remote 
sellers are excessive.  The Court’s holding in Quill, however, allows 
businesses without a substantial nexus to avoid use-tax collection and, 
thus, inspires states to develop their own approaches to collect the taxes. 
D. State Approaches to Collecting Sales and Use Taxes from Remote 
Sellers and Purchasers 
1. Affiliate Taxes 
With almost every state facing budget shortfalls and economic 
problems, some states have taken an aggressive approach to collecting 
use taxes from remote sellers by implementing affiliate tax laws.73  The 
New York affiliate law presumes that a remote seller does business 
within New York when: 
[T]he seller enters into an agreement with a resident of [New York] 
under which the resident, for a commission or other consideration, 
directly or indirectly refers potential customers, whether by a link 
on an internet website or otherwise, to the seller, if the cumulative 
gross receipts from sales by the seller to customers in the state who 
are referred to the seller by all residents with this type of an 
agreement with the seller is in excess of ten thousand dollars during 
the preceding four quarterly periods . . . .74 
These laws directly combat Internet retailers who refuse to collect and 
remit use taxes.75  “While [twenty-one] states have considered ‘Amazon’ 
laws in the past three years, only seven have enacted them: Arkansas, 
California, Connecticut, Illinois, New York, North Carolina, and Rhode 
                                                          
 72. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100, 108 (1975) (quoting W. Live Stock v. 
Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 73. Joseph Henchman, “Amazon Tax” Laws Signal Business Unfriendliness and Will Worsen 
Short-Term Budget Problems, TAX FOUND. (Mar. 8, 2010), http://taxfoundation.org/news/show/ 
25949.html.  Such laws have earned many different names, including affiliate taxes, affiliate nexus 
taxes, and Amazon taxes.  Id. 
 74. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi) (McKinney Supp. 2012). 
 75. Gordon, supra note 65, at 309; see also supra Part II.C.1. 
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Island.”76  The reaction to affiliate laws varies, and some opponents have 
claimed that they are unconstitutional.77  The response by businesses has 
been harsh, including Amazon’s cutting all of its ties with affiliates in 
several states, including Colorado, North Carolina, and Rhode Island.78 
The New York affiliate law—which is very similar to the laws in 
both North Carolina and Rhode Island—has several safeguards in place 
to ensure that a “substantial nexus” exists.79  New York’s law deems a 
company to have a rebuttable presumption of physical presence in the 
state—thus satisfying the substantial nexus requirement of Quill80—if the 
remote seller paid an independent contractor with a New York address 
for referring customers to its website and those referred transactions 
resulted in sales of over $10,000 to New York residents.81  The law is 
broad in that if only one affiliate refers over $10,000 in sales, then the 
remote seller must collect use taxes on all sales made to New York 
residents.82  Thus, a remote seller could have only one affiliate in the 
state, and so long as that one affiliate refers enough sales, the remote 
seller will be liable for collecting the use tax on all sales to New York 
residents and not just sales referred through affiliates.83 
“This presumption may be rebutted by proof that the resident with 
whom the seller has an agreement did not engage in any solicitation in 
the state on behalf of the seller that would satisfy the nexus requirement 
of the United States [C]onstitution during the four quarterly periods in 
question.”84  Thus, the remote seller may rebut the presumption of 
physical presence—and, accordingly, the substantial nexus 
requirement—by “includ[ing] in its agreement a condition that in-state 
commissioned representatives are prohibited from engaging in 
solicitation activities in New York on its behalf and ensur[ing] 
compliance through a certification.”85  This provision allows remote 
                                                          
 76. Joseph Henchman, California Becomes Seventh State to Adopt “Amazon” Tax on Out-of-
State Online Sellers, TAX FOUND. (July 1, 2011), http://www.taxfoundation.org/news/show/ 
27416.html. 
 77. See Henchman, supra note 73. 
 78. Verne G. Kopytoff, Amazon Pressured on Sales Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2011, at B1. 
 79. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi).  Because the affiliate laws of North Carolina and Rhode 
Island are similar enough to New York’s law, a separate discussion of each is unwarranted. 
 80. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313–14 (1992). 
 81. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Amazon.com LLC v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 877 N.Y.S.2d 842, 846 (Sup. Ct. 
2009), aff’d as modified, 913 N.Y.S.2d 129 (App. Div. 2010). 
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sellers to avoid use-tax collection.  Therefore, the law takes care not to 
place collection burdens on those businesses that lack a substantial 
nexus.  Not surprisingly, New York’s affiliate law faced a constitutional 
challenge almost immediately, with results that may change the 
landscape of use taxes.86 
2. The Increased-Notification Approach 
Colorado enacted into law House Bill No. 10-1193 on February 24, 
2010.87  This new law is an effort by Colorado to increase reporting and 
notification requirements, with the hope of increasing use-tax 
compliance by individuals.88  The Colorado law gives remote sellers a 
choice: either collect use taxes on Colorado purchases or notify the 
purchaser that use tax is due on purchases made from that retailer.89  
Further, if the remote seller does not collect the tax, then it must include 
a notification to the buyer stating that Colorado requires the purchaser to 
file a use-tax return.90  This notification must accompany every purchase 
from a non-collecting retailer.91  Colorado regulations prescribe the 
required contents of such notice, which must inform the purchaser that: 
(i) The non-collecting retailer does not collect Colorado sales or 
use tax; 
(ii) The purchase is not exempt from Colorado sales or use tax 
merely because it is made over the Internet or by other remote 
means; 
(iii) The State of Colorado requires that a Colorado purchaser (A) 
files a sales or use tax return at the end of the year reporting all of 
the taxable Colorado purchases that were not taxed and (B) pay tax 
on those purchases.92 
                                                          
 86. Id. at 846, 849–51. 
 87. Act of Feb. 24, 2010, ch. 9, § 2, 2010 Colo. Sess. Laws 54 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 39-21-112 (3.5)(c)(I) (West Supp. 2011)).  It is of note that a Colorado judge granted a 
preliminary injunction that, in effect, prevents Colorado from enforcing the relevant parts of its law.  
Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Huber, No. 10-cv-01546-REB-CBS, 2011 WL 250556, at *1–6 (Jan. 26, 
2011).  Oklahoma also implemented a similar notification law, but it is much less stringent than 
Colorado’s law.  See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 1406.1 (West Supp. 2011). 
 88. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-21-112 (3.5)(c)(I). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. COLO. CODE REGS. § 39-21-112.3.5(2)(b) (2012). 
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In addition to the notification required for every purchase, remote 
sellers that ship goods to Colorado addresses must also send annual 
notifications to the Colorado purchasers.93  These annual “notification[s] 
shall include, if available, the dates of purchases, the amounts of each 
purchase, and the category of the purchase, including, if known by the 
retailer, whether the purchase is exempt or not exempt from taxation.”94  
The notification must state that “Colorado requires a sales or use tax 
return to be filed and sales or use tax paid on certain Colorado purchases 
made by the purchaser from the retailer.”95  Further, the non-collecting 
retailers must also send an annual statement to the Colorado Department 
of Revenue.96  This statement must include the total amount each 
Colorado consumer purchased from that non-collecting retailer during 
the preceding calendar year.97  Colorado’s new law differs from all of the 
other approaches because it gives remote sellers an option: collect and 
remit the use tax due or send the required notifications.  The law is the 
only of the three approaches that puts pressure on the end consumer 
instead of the remote seller. 
3. Streamlined Sales Tax Project 
The Streamlined Sales Tax Project (SSTP) formally launched in 
2000 as a collaborative effort among several states.98  This collaboration 
produced the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA).99  
The SSUTA intends to “simplify and modernize sales and use tax 
administration in order to substantially reduce the burden of tax 
compliance.”100  Twenty-four states, whose populations represent 33% of 
the United States’ total population, have adopted the SSUTA.101  The 
SSUTA attempts to reduce the compliance and administrative burdens of 
the use tax—one of the main reasons the Quill court ruled against use-tax 
collection102—so that states can require remote sellers to figure, collect, 
                                                          
 93. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-21-112(3.5)(d)(I)(A). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. § 39-21-112(3.5)(d)(II)(A). 
 97. Id. 
 98. About Us, STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOV’G BD., INC., http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/ 
index.php?page=About-Us (last visited Nov. 6, 2011). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5. 
 102. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313 (1992). 
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and remit use taxes.  The SSTP and SSUTA differ from the other 
approaches because Congress needs to pass legislation requiring all 
states to be full members; ultimately, the SSTP anticipates federal 
legislation authorizing state sales and use-tax collection from remote 
sellers catalyzed by the SSUTA’s simplification of tax administration.103  
The SSTP and SSUTA are a response to the Court in Quill,104 which, 
reiterating Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, left open Congress’s 
ability to reverse its decision.105  Without action by Congress, the SSTP 
and SSUTA will fail to increase use-tax revenue for member states.106 
The SSUTA attempts to achieve its goals of simplicity and 
uniformity in several ways.  One way is that the SSUTA requires 
members to utilize a “Library of Definitions” for products that a 
jurisdiction may potentially subject to tax.107  For example, until recently, 
states did not even have a uniform definition of candy.108  These non-
uniform definitions only add to the complexity of use taxes and increase 
the burdens on remote sellers.  The SSUTA also limits a state’s ability to 
tax an item contained in the library unless the state uses the prescribed 
definition.109  When a state wishes to tax an item, “[it] must then 
establish a tax ‘matrix’ in which [it] check[s] off which of the library 
items [it] will tax.”110  The SSUTA also limits the number of tax rates a 
state can have, including those rates imposed by counties and 
localities.111  A state desiring to join the SSTP must prove substantial 
compliance with the current SSUTA.112  While the SSTP and SSUTA 
have gained acceptance, several attempts at passing federal legislation 
have failed.113  This illustrates the major flaw of the SSTP: without 
                                                          
 103. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5 (describing how the simplification of sales 
and use-tax administration, as proposed by the SSUTA, lays the groundwork for congressional 
action). 
 104. See About Us, supra note 98. 
 105. Quill, 504 U.S. at 318. 
 106. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5. 
 107. STREAMLINED SALES AND USE TAX AGREEMENT (SSUTA) § 327 (2011), available at 
http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/uploads/downloads/Archive/SSUTA/SSUTA%20AS%20Amend
ed%2005-19-11.pdf. 
 108. Henchman, supra note 12. 
 109. Galle, supra note 56, at 1393 (citing SSUTA § 304). 
 110. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 111. See id. at 1393 (citing SSUTA § 308). 
 112. SSUTA §§ 804, 805. 
 113. See Sales Tax Fairness and Simplification Act, H.R. 3396, 110th Cong. (2007); Streamlined 
Sales Tax Simplification Act, S. 2153, 109th Cong. (2005); Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Act, S. 
1736, 108th Cong. (2003); Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Act, H.R. 3184, 108th Cong. (2003); 
Internet Tax Moratorium and Equity Act, S. 512, 107th Cong. (2001). 
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congressional action, the SSTP will not achieve its overarching goal—
decreasing burdens on use-tax compliance and, therefore, increasing use-
tax revenues for states. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Due Process Analysis of State Approaches 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution lay 
out the Due Process Clauses.  These Clauses combine to protect citizens 
from deprivation of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”114  Due process, as applied to the states’ abilities to tax interstate 
transactions, has gone through many changes over the years.115  The 
Quill Court, however, laid out a standard116 that has survived for the last 
two decades.117  While a due process challenge is easier to withstand than 
a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge, it still warrants discussion. 
In Quill, the Court backed off the physical-presence standard that 
had dominated the due process tax analysis for many years, replacing it 
with standards concerned with “fundamental fairness.”118  The Court 
stated that due process was more of a “flexible inquiry into whether a 
defendant’s contacts with the forum made it reasonable . . . to require it 
to defend the suit in that State.”119  The Court took the test for due 
process indirectly from the personal jurisdiction analysis, affirming that a 
business that “purposefully avails” itself of a market is subject to 
jurisdiction in the state, even without physical presence.120  Thus, the 
                                                          
 114. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 115. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306–08 (1992) (discussing prior Supreme 
Court decisions regarding the due process limitations on states’ taxation of transactions in interstate 
commerce). 
 116. Id. at 312–13 (1992). 
 117. Red Earth LLC v. United States, 728 F. Supp. 2d 238, 247–48 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (applying 
the Quill due process standard to state taxes levied on an out-of-state seller). 
 118. Quill, 504 U.S. at 312. 
 119. Id. at 307. 
 120. Id.  As the Court had previously explained in the context of personal jurisdiction, the 
consideration requires a multi-part analysis: 
Thus where the defendant “deliberately” has engaged in significant activities within a 
State or has created “continuing obligations” between himself and residents of the forum, 
he manifestly has availed himself of the privilege of conducting business there, and 
because his activities are shielded by “the benefits and protections” of the forum’s laws it 
is presumptively not unreasonable to require him to submit to the burdens of litigation in 
that forum as well. 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475–76 (1985) (citations omitted) (quoting Keeton 
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Quill Court found it appropriate—at least for due process purposes—that 
a state could require the business to collect and remit use taxes when it 
could properly subject the business to suit within the state.121 
All the individual state approaches discussed in this Comment appear 
to satisfy due process by including a de minimis standard in their 
respective laws.  For example, in New York, a remote seller must have 
entered into an agreement with a New York resident that resulted in the 
resident’s referring more than $10,000 in gross receipts to the seller 
before the law requires it to collect use taxes.122  The $10,000 in gross 
sales must have been to consumers located in New York.123  This de 
minimis exception guarantees that the remote seller has directed 
“substantial” business toward the state through either an agreement with 
the in-state affiliate or sales made to consumers, thus satisfying the due 
process purposeful availment requirement.  North Carolina’s version of 
the affiliate tax law contains a de minimis exception of $10,000,124 while 
Rhode Island’s tax includes de minimis exception of $5,000.125  
Colorado’s increased notification law also contains a de minimis 
provision: the remote seller must have over $100,000 in sales to 
Colorado purchasers before being subject to the law’s requirements.126  
All of these de minimis standards attempt to ensure that a remote seller 
required to collect taxes has purposefully directed its activities at a state, 
thus satisfying due process. 
The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court recently 
held that New York’s affiliate law, on its face, did not violate the Due 
Process Clause.127  Previously, the lower court had dismissed complaints 
alleging that the statute was unconstitutional under the Due Process 
Clause, the Commerce Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause.128  
While the law survived all three facial challenges, the court remanded the 
                                                                                                                       
v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984); Travers Health Ass’n v. Virginia ex rel. State 
Corp. Comm’n, 339 U.S. 643, 648 (1950)). 
 121. Quill, 504 U.S. at 307–08 (rejecting Quill Corp.’s due process challenge to a North Dakota 
use tax because Quill “purposefully directed its activities” at residents, its contacts were sufficient in 
magnitude, and the tax “related to the benefits Quill receive[d] from access to the State”). 
 122. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi) (McKinney Supp. 2012). 
 123. Id. 
 124. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 105-164.8(b)(3) (West Supp. 2010). 
 125. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 44-18-15(a)(2) (West Supp. 2011). 
 126. COLO. CODE REGS. § 39-21-112.3.5(1)(a)(iii) (2012). 
 127. Amazon.com, LLC v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 913 N.Y.S.2d 129, 139–41 
(App. Div. 2010), aff’g as modified 877 N.Y.S.2d 842 (Sup. Ct. 2009). 
 128. Amazon.com, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 846. 
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case because there was insufficient evidence to make a determination on 
the as-applied claims under the Commerce and Due Process Clauses.129  
In regard to the due process challenge, the court first noted that the 
statute required remote sellers that solicited business in New York 
through affiliates to collect use taxes.130  The court implied that 
solicitation by affiliates establishes purposeful availment of New York 
for remote sellers.131  Next, the court found rational the law’s 
presumption that affiliates would in fact solicit business, instead of 
merely advertising.132  The court deemed this presumption rational 
because it is the goal of both the affiliate and the remote seller to make 
money.133  To maximize earnings, at least some affiliates would engage 
in solicitation, thus invoking the law’s requirements.134  Therefore, even 
absent a de minimis requirement, New York’s law—and presumably 
other affiliate laws—did not facially violate the Due Process Clause. 
By their design, the SSTP and SSUTA do not warrant due process 
analysis.  The Court in Quill practically asked for the formation of the 
SSTP.135  The Court wrote that “Congress is now free to decide whether, 
when, and to what extent the States may burden interstate mail-order 
concerns with a duty to collect use taxes,”  which is a sign that the Due 
Process Clause does not prohibit Congress from imposing uniform use 
and sales tax laws throughout the country.136 
Thus, the SSTP merely awaits congressional implementation, and it 
will not have to face due process challenge.  The SSUTA, however, may 
run afoul of the essence of due process.  First, due process asks whether a 
business purposefully avails itself of a state’s market by taking advantage 
of the protections and rights that a state offers.137  The SSUTA, though, 
contains no de minimis exception or other requirement to guarantee that 
the business has purposefully directed its activities at a chosen state.  
Because many large businesses already have procedures in place to 
figure, collect, and remit use taxes, they will not realize significant 
                                                          
 129. Amazon.com, 913 N.Y.S.2d at 145–46. 
 130. Id. at 139. 
 131. See id. at 140. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992) (“[T]he underlying issue is not 
only one that Congress may be better qualified to resolve, but also one that Congress has the ultimate 
power to resolve.” (footnote omitted)). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 306–07. 
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damage from the adoption of the SSUTA and congressional 
implementation of the SSTP.  On the other hand, smaller businesses—
likely taking advantage of fewer state benefits—will not have procedures 
in place to immediately deal with the law.  Thus, while a large 
business—receiving many benefits from a state—can comply with the 
SSTP in a matter of hours, a small business will have to incur large costs 
and dramatic changes to comply with the new system.  Even though a 
congressionally adopted SSTP will avoid due process challenge, it will 
not avoid the due process problems faced by the other approaches. 
Every approach appears to withstand due process challenge—based 
in large part on the standards ensuring that a business “purposefully 
avails” itself of the state’s market.  As noted in Quill, however, due 
process will not often render a tax law unconstitutional.138  The law must 
also pass the more stringent Dormant Commerce Clause analysis. 
B. Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis of State Approaches 
The “Dormant” Commerce Clause is a legal doctrine inferred from 
the Commerce Clause in Article I of the U.S. Constitution.  Because the 
Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to regulate commerce 
among the states,139 the negative inference is that the Clause bars states 
from imposing laws that improperly burden or discriminate against 
interstate commerce.140  The Court solidified the Dormant Commerce 
Clause’s application to state taxes in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. 
Brady,141 and the Quill Court adopted this standard.142  In Complete Auto, 
the Court held that a state may require a remote seller to collect taxes on 
the state’s behalf when the “tax is applied to an activity with a substantial 
nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate 
against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided 
by the State.”143  The first and fourth prongs of the test “limit the reach of 
state taxing authority so as to ensure that state taxation does not unduly 
burden interstate commerce.”144  The second and third prongs “prohibit 
                                                          
 138. Id. at 306–08. 
 139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 140. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9. Wheat.) 1, 13–17 (1824). 
 141. 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (adopting a four-factor test for assessing tax laws against 
Commerce Clause challenge). 
 142. Quill, 504 U.S. at 310. 
 143. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279. 
 144. Quill, 504 U.S. at 313. 
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taxes that pass an unfair share of the tax burden onto interstate 
commerce.”145 
The “substantial nexus” requirement of the Complete Auto test—the 
first prong—has created the most controversy.  Some commentators 
suggest the only way to satisfy substantial nexus is through physical 
presence, such as a store or employees within a state.146  This argument, 
however, expands the Quill decision too far, especially when considering 
that Quill did not account for the potentials of the Internet and e-
commerce.  Without question, the Quill Court established that a retailer 
“whose only connection with customers in the [taxing] State is by 
common carrier” is free from the duty to collect taxes for that state.147  
As sales have become less dependent on physical interactions, fewer 
businesses have the requisite substantial nexus with a state, and 
inevitably, states lose tax revenue. 
Even the Court in Quill disagreed over what satisfied the “substantial 
nexus” requirement.  In a lengthy and persuasive dissent, Justice White 
argues that physical presence in an economy is an archaic view of 
commerce.148  Justice White pointed to the many advantages remote 
sellers gain from doing business with residents of a state, even though 
they may never actually have a “physical presence” within that state: 
These advantages include laws establishing sound local banking 
institutions to support credit transactions; courts to ensure collection 
of the purchase price from the seller’s customers; means of waste 
disposal from garbage generated by mail-order solicitations; and 
creation and enforcement of consumer protection laws, which 
protect buyers and sellers alike, the former by ensuring that they 
will have a ready means of protecting against fraud, and the latter 
by creating a climate of consumer confidence that inures to the 
benefit of reputable dealers in mail-order transactions.149 
                                                          
 145. Id. 
 146. Daniel Tyler Cowan, Recent Development, New York’s Unconstitutional Tax on the 
Internet: Amazon.com v. New York State Department of Taxation & Finance and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1423, 1436 (2010) (“The Quill Court was clear: physical 
presence, in the form of ‘a small sales force, plant or office’ is required.” (quoting Quill, 504 U.S. at 
315)).  This statement by the Court is at best dicta because the court admits this area of law is a 
“quagmire” and that the rule is rather artificial.  Quill, 504 U.S. at 315.  Further, the Court’s used 
this exact language: “Whether or not a State may compel a vendor to collect a sales or use tax may 
turn on the presence in the taxing State of a small sales force, plant, or office.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 147. Quill, 504 U.S. at 315 (alteration in original) (quoting Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of 
Revenue, 386 U.S. 754, 758 (1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 148. Id. at 327–28 (White, J., dissenting). 
 149. Id. at 328. 
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Justice White’s dissent practically predicts the rise of e-commerce.  
The arguments he advances apply even more readily to today’s society 
where many transactions occur digitally, without any type of physical 
interaction.  In the almost twenty years since Quill, the opportunities for 
a remote seller to reap the benefits of a state without having any use-tax-
collection responsibility toward that state have grown.  Such 
opportunities have motivated states to develop the innovative approaches 
that require remote sellers to “pay” for these benefits. 
As previously mentioned, the Appellate Division of the New York 
Supreme Court recently ruled on facial and as-applied challenges under 
the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Commerce Clauses to New 
York’s affiliate law.150  The court held that the law, on its face, did not 
violate the Commerce Clause.151  First, the court found the requisite 
substantial nexus because the law imposes obligations on a remote seller 
“only where the [remote seller] enters into a business-referral agreement 
with a New York State resident, and only when that resident receives a 
commission based on a sale in New York.”152  The court emphasized that 
“passive advertising” would not satisfy the required substantial nexus, 
but solicitation by affiliates would.153  The law meets this requirement by 
allowing the remote seller to rebut the presumption of physical presence 
by proving all affiliates engaged only in advertising.154  A remote seller 
“merely has to include in its contract with the in-state vendor a provision 
prohibiting [the affiliate] from ‘engaging in any solicitation 
activities . . .’ and the in-state representative must provide an annual 
certification that it has not engaged in any prohibited solicitation.”155  
Therefore, the law does not violate the Commerce Clause because it 
imposes obligations only on remote sellers who contract with in-state 
residents and only when those residents engage in direct solicitation.156 
The decision suggests that as long as an affiliate law requires 
solicitation, and not merely advertising, it will pass a facial Dormant 
Commerce Clause challenge.  Problems may still arise, especially when a 
specific business challenges an affiliate law.  As pointed out by the court 
                                                          
 150. Amazon.com, LLC v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 913 N.Y.S.2d 129, 146 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2010), aff’g as modified 877 N.Y.S.2d 842 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009). 
 151. Id. at 138. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 138–39. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 156. Id. 
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in New York, when all of a business’s affiliates only advertise and do not 
solicit business, the substantial nexus does not exist.157  Therefore, it is 
imperative that all affiliate laws have safeguards in place to guarantee 
that in-state representatives actually solicit business for the remote seller.  
New York safeguards businesses with affiliates engaged in purely 
advertising by allowing the remote seller “a ready escape hatch or safe 
harbor” through the rebuttable presumption of solicitation.158  Even with 
the safeguard in place, New York’s law must still pass the as-applied 
challenge, which may require proving that thousands of affiliates did 
solicit business for their online retailers. 
It is not entirely clear how a court would apply the Dormant 
Commerce Clause to Colorado’s increased notification approach.  In 
Colorado, the remote seller does not have the burden of collecting the 
use tax and only bears the burden of notifying consumers of purchases 
that are subject to the use tax.159  This notification burden differs greatly 
from the burdens recognized by the Court in Quill—the requirements of 
figuring, remitting, and collecting the use tax.160  Therefore, it is 
undecided how much of a burden the notification standards place on 
remote sellers and whether a “substantial nexus” would be required. 
Nonetheless, Colorado’s law likely survives a Dormant Commerce 
Clause challenge for two reasons.  First, it does not require the business 
to calculate, collect, and remit use taxes.161  Under the Colorado law, a 
remote seller is not responsible for figuring and collecting the tax unless 
it chooses to do so to avoid the reporting requirements.162  A remote 
seller subject to the Colorado law has two responsibilities: keeping track 
of its sales shipped to Colorado addresses and notifying the purchaser 
and state of the sales.163  The law implicitly recognizes that figuring and 
collecting use tax is much more burdensome than the notification 
requirements; thus, Colorado allows the remote seller to collect the tax 
instead of notifying Colorado purchasers of their obligation to pay the 
tax. 
  
                                                          
 157. Id. at 138–39. 
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 159. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-21-112(3.5) (West Supp. 2011). 
 160. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 302 (1992) (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-
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 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
GRIFFITHS FINAL 4/19/2012  2:26 PM 
2012] USE IT OR LOSE IT 671 
Second, the Colorado law attempts to minimize the burdens placed 
on remote sellers.164  It includes a provision that allows a non-collecting 
retailer to use a generalized notification if it also faces the same reporting 
requirements in others states.165  If other states implement a similar type 
of notification law, then multi-state retailers face minimal compliance 
burdens.  This is important because, as stated in Quill, the state must 
limit the burdens it places on the out-of-state businesses so as to avoid 
burdening interstate commerce.166  Because the law allows businesses to 
use the same notification in several states, Colorado has actively sought 
to diminish the burdens its law places on remote sellers.167 
While the Colorado law only requires remote sellers to comply with 
the notification requirements, some of the regulated entities have asserted 
that the law “clearly intended to increase the compliance burden to a 
point where online retailers will be induced to ‘voluntarily’ collect 
Colorado sales tax.”168  While this argument may have some merit, the 
holding in Quill undercuts it.  The Court in Quill noted that required 
compliance with the various taxing jurisdictions, different definitions, 
and assorted exemptions imposed an undue administrative burden.169  
Here, the business must comply only with reporting purchases to the 
state; there is nothing to keep track of outside of what the business 
already possesses, which is the consumer’s name, addresses, and 
purchases.  A court would be less likely to find an undue burden where a 
business must provide information that it already possesses.  Even with 
these provisions in place, Colorado’s law faces staunch opposition from 
remote sellers. 
A recently filed lawsuit challenges Colorado’s new law by arguing 
that it discriminates against out-of-state retailers and unduly burdens 
interstate commerce.170  The plaintiff alleges that the Colorado law 
discriminates against out-of-state retailers because they must spend time 
                                                          
 164. Id. 
 165. COLO. CODE REGS. § 39-21-112.3.5(2)(e) (2010). 
 166. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313 (1992). 
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 168. Amazon Reacts to Colorado Interest Sales Tax Measure by Firing Its Colorado Associates, 
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 169. Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 n.6. 
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and money to change their business practices to comply with the new 
law, while retailers located within Colorado are not subject to the same 
reporting requirements.171  Even though Colorado’s law attempts to 
reduce the burdens placed on remote sellers, some burdens must 
inevitably fall on the remote seller in order to increase use-tax revenue.  
Colorado’s law differs from other approaches, however, because the true 
burden—as specified in Quill as figuring, collecting, and remitting the 
use tax—falls on the consumer and not on the business. 
A Dormant Commerce Clause analysis of the SSTP and SSUTA is 
unnecessary.172  The SSTP—formed in response to the Quill Court’s 
calling on Congress to resolve the use-tax-collection dispute—by design 
avoids a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge.  Because Congress has 
the authority to determine what burdens commerce,173 adoption of the 
SSUTA would indicate that Congress believes that the measure did not 
burden interstate commerce.  Thus, if Congress required all states to 
adopt the SSUTA, no basis would exist to challenge it on Dormant 
Commerce Clause grounds.  As previously discussed, however, the 
SSUTA and SSTP contain several flaws that make passage by Congress 
highly unlikely. 
C. Feasibility of Implementing State Approaches 
States that have enacted affiliate laws have encountered many 
implementation problems.  With large retailers cutting ties with affiliates 
and eroding the required nexus,174 states have realized that the approach 
included unforeseen flaws.  The affiliate laws’ intention of taxing 
companies through independent contractors and affiliates—thus avoiding 
entity isolation issues—has backfired.  This shows the main weakness of 
the affiliate laws: a remote seller can erode the nexus, which Part III.D 
discusses in more detail.  Further, large remote sellers have almost 
unlimited resources to challenge these laws.  As evidenced by the 
lawsuits and opposition to the affiliate laws, states have a long hill to 
climb before the approaches will achieve their goals. 
  
                                                          
 171. Id. 
 172. Still, SSUTA’s sourcing scheme potentially burdens interstate commerce and, thus, 
threatens its implementation.  See Part III.C. 
 173. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 318. 
 174. See, e.g., Kopytoff, supra note 78, at B1 (describing how Amazon fired its in-state affiliates 
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An aspect of the Colorado law that makes it superior to the affiliate 
laws is that the remote seller cannot exempt itself from the law by cutting 
ties with the state.  Therefore, even if a company fires off all its affiliates 
within Colorado—as Amazon did175—the remote seller would still face 
the notification requirements.  Because Colorado based its notification 
requirements solely on the amount of sales, it avoided the problem of 
remote sellers eroding the nexus and eluding the requirements of the law. 
On the other hand, Colorado will likely face consumer backlash 
against the law.  The average individual consumer is likely entirely 
unaware of the use tax.  Because the law makes consumers aware of 
taxes on purchases that for years went tax-free, opposition will likely 
grow.  Some consumers might refuse to comply with the use tax despite 
the state’s awareness of their purchases.  If the courts ultimately uphold 
Colorado’s law against a Commerce Clause challenge, then Colorado has 
a good chance to successfully implement the law—even if a substantial 
amount of opposition exists—because, in contrast to affiliate laws, 
neither remote sellers nor consumers has the power to avoid the law’s 
requirements. 
Implementation of the SSTP and SSUTA requires a single act of 
Congress for full implementation.  In the twenty years since the Court in 
Quill called on Congress to regulate in the area of sales and use tax,176 
Congress has not taken action.  Therefore, although the SSTP is only one 
piece of legislation away from achieving its goal, congressional 
authorization appears unlikely.177  Twenty-four states have adopted the 
SSUTA and “more states are moving to adopt [it].”178  If the SSTP 
counts as members a majority of U.S. states—or states with a majority of 
the U.S. population—then Congress might feel the pressure to act.  
Currently, insufficient pressure exists. 
Besides a lack of congressional action, the SSTP and SSUTA face 
additional obstacles.  The SSUTA contains serious flaws, which some 
commentators argue should prevent its nationwide implementation.179  
The biggest debate about the SSUTA is the dispute between origin-based 
sourcing and destination-based sourcing.180  This problem arises because 
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 176. Quill, 504 U.S. at 318. 
 177. See Swain, supra note 52, at 370. 
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“[w]hen the product is received by the purchaser at a business location of 
the seller, the sale is sourced to that business location.”181  On the other 
hand, “[w]hen the product is not received by the purchaser at a business 
location of the seller, the sale is sourced to the location where receipt by 
the purchaser . . . occurs, including the location indicated by instruction 
for delivery to the purchaser.”182  Many opponents argue that this 
structure is antithetical to one of the SSTP’s stated goals: taxing like 
transactions alike.183  In effect, remote sellers must collect use taxes 
based on the customer’s location, while stores with a physical presence 
in a state must collect tax in only one jurisdiction.184  Thus, remote 
sellers face a much greater burden—possibly enough to burden interstate 
commerce185—and the problem addressed by the Court in Quill 
persists.186  The SSTP should resolve the sourcing problem to facilitate 
nationwide acceptance. 
A second problem of the SSTP is that it allows states to bypass its 
rules.187  On the one hand, “the SSTP requires that all states have a 
uniform definition of clothing and tax all of it (or none of it) at the same 
rate.”188  Minnesota, however, imposed a separate “fur tax” on fur 
sales.189  “Rather than recognizing this as an end-run around tax 
uniformity, the SSTP upheld Minnesota’s action.”190  The SSTP only 
requires substantial compliance from states,191 and such minutiae likely 
did not bring the state out of compliance.  For full implementation, the 
SSTP must take steps to actually reach uniformity and reduce the 
burdens placed on remote sellers.  The aforementioned flaws justify 
Congress’s complacency regarding the SSTP. 
                                                                                                                       
apply the tax of the originating jurisdiction or the destination jurisdiction.  Id. 
 181. SSUTA § 310(A)(1) (2011), available at http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/uploads/ 
downloads/Archive/SSUTA/SSUTA%20As%20Amended%2005-19-11.pdf. 
 182. Id. § 310(A)(2). 
 183. See, e.g., Henchman, supra note 12 (noting that the SSTP has “abandoned the notion of 
taxing like transactions alike” with its sourcing scheme). 
 184. Henchman, supra note 11. 
 185. See generally Swain & Hellerstein, supra note 180 (discussing origin- and destination-based 
sourcing, and prescribing several solutions to the problem). 
 186. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312–15 (1992) (discussing how a state’s use tax 
may unduly burden interstate commerce). 
 187. See Henchman, supra note 12. 
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 191. SSUTA §§ 804, 805 (2011), available at http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/uploads/ 
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1. Hybrid Solution: States Implementing the SSUTA in Addition to 
Other Measures 
Arkansas, North Carolina, and Rhode Island have all implemented 
affiliate taxes192 while still retaining full membership in the SSTP.193  
Thus, a state with an affiliate law still maintains substantial compliance 
even though the tax contradicts the SSTP’s main goals of uniformity and 
simplicity.  As with Minnesota’s fur taxes, the SSTP needs to stick to its 
guns.  In other words, if it wants federal legislation, the SSTP should 
strongly consider requiring more uniformity from the states.  Permitting 
state deviation undercuts the SSTP’s goals and gives opponents a strong 
argument against implementation. 
2. Notification Requirements Cause Privacy Concerns 
Some of the approaches may also be prone to attack on privacy 
grounds.  Colorado’s law undoubtedly will face privacy challenges,194 
and North Carolina has seen the effect firsthand.195  These privacy 
concerns arise from the states’ gathering of details regarding purchases 
and consumers’ wariness of the states’ having the information.  As 
evidenced in North Carolina, purchasers were afraid that the state would 
obtain “title-specific data on customer book purchases.”196  The state’s 
need for detailed information on purchases stems from the fact that it 
needs to determine if a purchase is taxable under that state’s sales- and 
use-tax system.  This issue arose in North Carolina when the state—in 
trying to determine Amazon’s compliance with the law—requested 
consumer-purchase information from Amazon.197  While this issue arose 
in a different context from what Colorado may face, the information 
requested remains substantially similar.  As one commentator has stated,  
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however, generalized information regarding purchases does not violate 
the First Amendment.198 
Thus, in order for states to require remote sellers to collect use 
taxes—or, in the case of Colorado, to require the companies to report 
purchase information to the state—they must ensure that the information 
requested is not specific enough to raise privacy concerns.  This should 
not be a problem because states generally require generic information in 
categories such as “books” or “food.”199  In going forward, states must 
recognize that they cannot request every detail of a transaction, as this 
could “create a chilling effect on the free flow of information.”200 
D. Approaches’ Ability to Increase Revenue and Improve Use-Tax 
Compliance 
In analyzing these approaches, the fundamental question for states is 
whether the adopted approach will bring in more revenue.  Several 
problems exist in determining how much revenue each approach has 
generated.  First, none of the approaches have been in place long enough 
to create measureable revenue streams.  Second, large retailers have 
repeatedly cut off all ties with affiliates in states that have imposed 
affiliate laws.201  Finally, some states have not spent the revenue or 
released statistics on their programs because they are waiting for the 
outcome of a lawsuit.202 
Initial reports about state implementation of affiliate laws are 
worrisome.  Rhode Island had not seen any increase in revenue from its 
law in the first six months after implementation.203  Compounding this 
problem is that Rhode Island and the other states that have implemented 
affiliate laws may actually lose revenue when large, remote sellers cut 
                                                          
 198. Oren Teicher, the CEO of the American Booksellers Association, acknowledged that “the 
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ties with all of their in-state affiliates.204  The states’ economies suffer 
because the in-state affiliates no longer receive commissions; which 
reduces their income tax and puts less money into the economy.  This 
result makes it clear that remote sellers will do almost anything to avoid 
collecting use taxes and keep the façade of low prices intact.  Therefore, 
affiliate laws will likely generate less revenue than expected because a 
remote seller can easily avoid the collection requirement.205 
Colorado’s notification law has several safeguards in place to 
decrease the chances of abuse by remote sellers and ensure that it collects 
as much revenue as possible.  The law takes care to prevent abuse by 
businesses but strives to lessen the burdens placed on remote sellers.  
First, Colorado avoids the problem faced by states with affiliate laws 
because remote sellers cannot avoid the requirements by merely cutting 
ties with affiliates.206  Because a remote seller’s affiliates do not trigger 
the notification requirements, Colorado’s law is less likely to drive away 
business.  Thus, even if a remote seller severs all ties with the state, the 
notification requirement still applies, provided the business meets the de 
minimis and other requirements.  Despite this provision, Amazon, as it 
had in other states, cut all ties with Colorado affiliates immediately after 
the state’s adoption of the law.207  This withdrawal—which undoubtedly 
decreased Amazon’s revenue in Colorado—plainly shows the lengths to 
which remote sellers will go to avoid use-tax responsibility.  Colorado 
has also safeguarded against abuse by a remote seller that attempts to 
practice forms of entity isolation.  The law exempts a remote seller from 
the notification requirements when it makes less than $100,000 in sales 
to Colorado residents.208  This $100,000 includes sales by affiliates or 
“entities controlled by or under common control with the non-collecting 
retailer.”209  Thus, a remote seller cannot avoid the notification 
requirements by funneling business through an affiliate or related entity. 
Two other aspects of the Colorado law make certain that Colorado 
realizes the highest amount of revenue possible.  First, Colorado attempts 
to take advantage of the fact that many remote sellers already have 
procedures in place to calculate use-tax liability.  For these retailers, it 
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may be less burdensome to collect the tax on each transaction instead of 
keeping records for all transactions and remitting the information to the 
purchaser and state.  The Colorado law allows any retailer that collects 
and remits use tax to avoid the reporting requirements,210 which some 
argue is the true intent of the law.211 
Second, Colorado’s law also seeks to increase revenue by making 
consumers aware of their use-tax liability.  The state likely intends to 
remedy the extremely low use-tax compliance rates of individuals and 
the Quill ruling’s near guarantee that a state cannot require a remote 
seller to collect and remit use tax.  As mentioned previously, Colorado 
avoids the burdens specifically decried by the Court in Quill: figuring, 
collecting, and remitting the use tax.212  Colorado has taken a proactive 
approach to increasing individual use-tax compliance.  By notifying 
Colorado residents that the use tax applies to some of their purchases—
while concurrently notifying them that the state has the information 
relating to their use-tax liability—the law places the pressure upon the 
individual to figure and remit the tax.  Therefore, the compliance rates 
will likely rise in Colorado because of either increased individual 
awareness of the tax liability or fear of repercussions for noncompliance 
with the law.  Either way, Colorado has moved the burden of use-tax 
collection from remote sellers—where the burden can almost never 
lie213—to individuals, who before were only responsible for collection 
and remittance in theory, not in practice. 
The SSTP has the ability to increase state revenue in tremendous 
amounts; however, until Congress acts, this revenue will go unrealized.  
The SSUTA currently contains no mechanism to elicit use-tax collection 
by remote sellers; it requires approval from Congress to achieve all of its 
goals.  While the SSUTA possesses ample revenue opportunities for the 
future, voluntary membership in the SSTP will not increase revenue.  As 
more states become members of the SSTP, the overall membership will 
approach a majority—either of the states or population—and gain 
support in Congress.  The flaws of the SSTP and the SSUTA, however, 
make majority membership and congressional action unlikely in the near 
future. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This Comment analyzes the varied approaches that states have taken 
to increase use- and sales-tax compliance with remote sellers.  While the 
approaches vary widely, they all have the same purpose: increase use-tax 
revenue in a constitutionally permissible way.  Though nothing seems 
clear in this area of the law, states should coordinate their efforts against 
remote sellers who do not cooperate with use- and sales-tax-collection 
laws.  The three separate approaches discussed each have merits and 
flaws.  Each has faced staunch opposition by remote sellers and others. 
The SSTP needs only congressional action to solve the entire use-
tax-collection dilemma.  Because it contains several major flaws, 
however, majority membership and congressional approval remain 
unlikely.  Without an affirmative act from Congress requiring the states 
to adopt the SSUTA, or something substantially similar, the SSTP is in 
limbo.  Because of the dire state of the economy and the boom of e-
commerce, states need the increased use-tax revenue now.  The SSTP 
will not bring revenue to states in the near future, or possibly at all.  
Therefore, any state that desires to increase revenue will need to turn to a 
different approach—such as affiliate laws or increased notification 
standards. 
For a state going out on its own, there are several problems as well.  
First, a state acting alone is not as strong as states that have banded 
together, especially when dealing with a national issue like interstate 
commerce.  With only three states implementing affiliate laws, retailers 
dismiss these laws as unconstitutional and proceed to funnel their 
business and affiliates through other states to avoid the responsibility of 
use-tax collection.  If more states followed the leads of Arkansas, 
California, Connecticut, Illinois, New York, North Carolina, and Rhode 
Island, then remote sellers would be less likely to cut ties with their 
affiliates, as they would be responsible for use-tax collection in more 
states and would have nowhere to isolate their advertising.  Furthermore, 
an increase in the number of states that have enacted affiliate laws will 
increase awareness of the use tax among purchasers.  This will cause 
more individuals to realize that they did not receive tax-free products; 
instead, they broke the law. 
Finally, Colorado has taken the most proactive approach to 
increasing individual awareness of the use tax.  The use-tax-collection 
burden in Colorado shifts from the business to the purchaser.  Because 
purchasers are always liable for payment of the use tax, it seems 
appropriate that they now bear the burden of figuring, collecting, and 
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remitting the tax.  It will be interesting to see how Colorado residents 
react to these changes.  While some may see it as increased taxes, others 
may see it as a burden and realize that the remote seller, and not the 
consumer, should bear responsibility for collection of the use tax.  For 
any state seeking to increase use-tax revenue in the short term, 
Colorado’s approach gives the most hope.  First, because the law does 
not depend upon a business’s having dispensable affiliates within a state, 
the business cannot cut ties with the state in order to avoid the 
notification requirements.  Second, Colorado’s law places fewer burdens 
upon the remote sellers.  By only requiring notification and not requiring 
them to figure, collect, and remit the use tax, Colorado avoids burdens 
pointed out by the Court in Quill.214  Third, even if Colorado’s law fails 
in some way, it undoubtedly will increase individual awareness of the 
use tax—likely allowing for measures to be taken in the future without as 
much opposition. 
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